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Canadian banks equity returns are positively impacted by contemporaneous (and lagged)
yield curve shifts.
Canadian bank equity returns have become more sensitive to changes in yield curve
spreads in the post 2007-2009 financial crisis.
Equity returns of Canadian banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the
yield curve (i.e., yield curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on
bank equity returns than yield curve spreads that are below their mean values over our
sample time horizon).
Yield curve swings could induce shifts in banks’ profit-seeking behavior towards noninterest income sources.
Our findings suggest that portfolio managers need to be aware of the sensitivity of bank
equity returns to changes in the yield curve given the potential implementation of a yield
curve control (YCC) policies by central banks.
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Abstract: We examine the reaction of Canadian banks equity returns to changes in yield curve
spreads. We find that Canadian banks equity returns are positively impacted by
contemporaneous (and lagged) yield curve spreads. Our results also suggest that Canadian banks
have become more sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve in the post 2007-2009
financial crisis. We also find an asymmetric impact of the slope of the yield curve on Canadian
bank equity returns. For equity investors, the yield curve’s relevance varies with spreadmaturities. Our findings have important implications for the estimations of banks’ cost of capital
and implicitly suggest regulatory incentives in favor of macro-prudential policy to evaluate bank
risk. Swings in yield curve spreads could induce shifts in banks’ profit-seeking behavior towards
non-interest income sources.
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1. Introduction

An important consequence of the unconventional monetary policy intervention, in

re

response to the global financial crisis (2007-2009), was an induced change in the slope of the
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yield curve under near-zero policy interest rates. The impact of this policy intervention changed
the banking operating environment and serves to motivate this research. Unlike many European
and American banks, the Canadian banking system remained strong and stable during the global
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financial crisis (GFC) as they did not require any form of a bailout; moreover, their regulatory
system received praise from many countries and global institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).1 Because of the apparent success of the Canadian banking system, it is

Jo

worthwhile to investigate how changes in yield curve spreads affect Canadian banks’ equity
returns and whether findings differ from previous studies on U.S. and European banks. Given the
specific nature of the Canadian banking system, it is particularly interesting to focus on the postGFC low interest rate environment. The bulk of the past research on the yield curve and bank

1

See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/ for the 2009 Global Financial Stability Report from the
IMF.

2

equity returns focuses on the U.S. and European banking systems (e.g. Schuermann and Stiroh,
2006, Viale et al., 2009, Baek and Bilson, 2015 and Ferrer et al., 2016). This paper departs from
the U.S. and European centric samples and focusses on the impact of yield curve spreads on
equity returns for the Canadian banking system. The aim of the paper is to provide evidence on
how a small-open economy with a highly regulated banking sector reacts to changes in the slope
of the yield curve. Canada provides an interesting financial services landscape to evaluate this

of

research due to the concentrated nature of the Canadian banking sector and its historical

ro

resilience to financial crisis.

Another country with banking sector characteristics that are similar to the Canadian
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banking sector is Australia; both of these banking sectors performed well during the GFC. Allen

re

et al. (2011) provides a detailed comparison of Canadian and Australian banks following the
GFC in order to better understand why Canadian and Australian banks performed relatively well

lP

during the GFC. Their paper identifies a number of factors, including the past conservatism of
Canadian and Australian regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy, the lack of
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compromised lending standards, and a focus on domestic lending. Advocates for a Canadiantype banking system argue that this success is the outcome of industry structure and strong
regulation.2

This study explores the following research questions: (1) Do changes in the slope of the
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yield curve impact equity returns of publicly-traded Canadian banks? (2) Do changes in yield
curve spreads have an asymmetric impact on bank stock returns and does the impact gradually

2

The reasoning behind why the Canadian financial markets faired so well has been attributed to various factors,
including strong regulatory regime, stringent capital requirements for banks, federal supervision, a concentrated
banking system, strict mortgage market regulations, and a conservative appetite for risk (Bordo et al., 2015; Calmes
& Theoret, 2013; Mohsni & Otchere, 2018). Further, it is a common practice for Canadian banks to hold mortgage on
their balance sheets, which results in the application of high level of due diligence in the underwriting of bank loans.
As a result, Canada did not experience the same degree of housing boom and bust that occurred in many other countries
during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.

3

diffuse into stock prices? (3) Does the impact of yield curve spreads on Canadian bank stock
returns differ between the pre and post 2007-2009 financial crisis periods? To explore these
research questions we focus on the slope of the yield curve (aka yields spreads) since it is a wellknown measure (used by practitioners and academics) that allows us to corroborate the common
belief that bank performance improves (i.e. increased cashflows due to higher net margins and
banks’ positive maturity gap) with an upward-sloping yield curve rather than under a horizontal

of

or downward-sloping yield curve. The reliance on the slope of the yield curve for this research

ro

seems appropriate given the nature of the Canadian banking system (i.e. their focus on domestic
lending (including real estate mortgages), and an adherence to a traditional banking model of
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financial intermediation (i.e. reliance on asset and maturity transformation activities). Modern
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financial theory usually associates upward-sloping yield curves with rising interest rates and
economic expansion; therefore, we anticipate a direct relationship between the slope of the yield

lP

curve and bank equity returns. The idea behind potential asymmetric impacts and lagged effects
of yield curve spreads on bank stock returns, as framed in our second research question, is that
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investors respond differently to “good news” versus “bad news” and that stock prices take time
to adjust to the arrival of new information.3 To investigate the impact of the of yield curve
spreads on bank equity returns in the pre and post (2007-2009) GFC periods, we include a crisis
dummy variable in full-sample estimations while controlling for the slope of the yield curve.

Jo

This allows to isolate the GFC effect on returns during an unprecedented low interest rate
environment.

Examining Canadian banks equity return behavior to changes in interest rates (changes in

yield curve spreads) will provide evidence to policymakers, regulators, and practitioners globally

3

Refer to the methodology and results sections for discussion and citations on asymmetric impacts and the lagged
effects (i.e. gradual information diffusion and under-reaction hypotheses).

4

to better understand how this particular banking structure (concentrated industry, strong
regulatory regime, conservative risk profile, etc.) performs in the midst of interest pressure from
domestic and global forces. Even with important changes in banking regulations and supervision
introduced in response to (2007-2009) GFC, little has been done to incorporate “market signals”
to gauge bank risk (Sarin and Summers, 2016). Over our sample period from 01/1997 to 8/2018,
we cover two interesting periods of financial turmoil that were preceded by inverted yield curves

of

associated with subsequent burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001 and the 2007-2009 GFC. Over
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the time frame of our research, yield curve spreads (measured as the difference between the 10year Treasury and the 3-month Treasury yields) reached a high of 3.781%, a low of -0.243%
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with an average spread of 0.932% (refer to Figure 2 for a visual of the yield curve spread

re

pattern).

Using data from 01/1997 to 08/2018 and employing the Fama-French five-factor model

lP

supplemented with the yield curve factor, we find that changes in yield curve spreads, together
with the Fama-French factors, explain the variation in Canadian bank-equity returns. Equity
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returns of Canadian banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the slope of the
yield curve (i.e. yield curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on bank
equity returns than yield curve spreads that are below their mean values over our sample time
horizon). Further, Canadian bank equity returns have become more sensitive to changes yield

Jo

curve spreads in the post 2007-2009 Global recession period. Lastly, the empirical evidence
from this research suggests that the changes in the slope of the yield curve may gradually diffuse
into banks’ equity returns.
These findings provide empirical evidence to supplement the conventional practitioner's
viewpoint that fluctuations in yield curve spreads influence the general equity market and, in

5

particular, banks stocks due to their: 1) high leverage, 2) inherent interest rate risk to the
financial intermediation process, and 3) market risk associated with trading activities. Further,
our paper studies the equity returns of Canadian banks during a period of significant
transformation in the banking system. While the Canadian banks performed much better than
U.S. banks during the global 2007-2009 crisis period, we find no published research that sheds
light on the influence of the yield curve on Canadian bank equity returns in either the pre- or

of

post-crisis interest rate environment with the exception of the study by Allen et al. (2011).
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Finally, given the increased attention from central banks (including the Bank of Canada) on the
potential implementation of a yield curve control (YCC) policy, this research provides a valuable
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up-to-date analysis of how yield curve spreads can influence equity returns.4 Given that the
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financial sector in Canada constitutes approximately 37% of the S&P/TSX composite index, it is
also important for institutional and retail investors to recognize the validity of the slope of the

lP

yield curve as a factor that helps explain the variation in bank stock returns.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review,

ur
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Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5
presents our conclusion and implications.
2. Literature Review
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2.1. Impact of the yield curve on bank equity returns

On December 10, 2020, Paul Beaudry (Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada) stated that “Should things take a
more persistent turn for the worse, we have a range of options at our disposal to provide additional monetary stimulus.
This could include increasing the stimulus power of our QE program, or it could involve targeting specific points in
the yield curve, otherwise known as yield-curve control.” See https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/12/our-quantitativeeasing-operations-looking-under-the-hood/
5
For further details on the S&P/TSX Composite and S&P/TSX 60 indices please see
https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-tsx-composite-index and https://ca.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-tsx60-index. The “Big Six” Canadian banks include: the Bank of Montreal (BMO), Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS),
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), National Bank (NB), Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), and TorontoDominion Bank (TD). These six banks make up approximately 90% of the assets under management in the Canadian
banking sector (see Calomiris and Haber (2015) for review and history of both the Canadian and U.S. banking sectors).
4

6

From an equity return perspective, Schuermann and Stiroh (2006) examine the common
factors that drive the equity returns of U.S. bank holding companies from 1997 to 2005. They
show that the market risk factor dominates in explaining bank returns followed by the FamaFrench factors (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). They also find that interest rate factors (i.e. one
period change in the risk-free rate, the slope of the yield curve, and credit spreads) are not
generally significant for large banks. However, the returns of small banks appear to be partially
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driven by the aforementioned interest rate factors. Viale et al. (2009) find that the stock market
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excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve are statistically significant in explaining
the cross-section of U.S. bank equity returns. Furthermore, they find no evidence that firm-
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specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in U.S. bank equity returns.

re

Baek and Bilson (2015) empirically test the Fama and French three-factor model, with the
inclusion of interest rate factors, on a large sample of U.S. non-financial and financial firms.
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They find that size and value risk premia commonly exist in both non-financial and financial
firms, supporting Barber and Lyon (1997), and that an interest rate risk premium only appears in
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financial companies. Forming portfolios of U.S. money center, large, and regional commercial
banks, Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) employ GARCH-M methodology to investigate the effect of
the long-term interest rate (and its volatility) on monthly banks stock returns over the time period
1970M1 to 1992M12. They find that the long-term interest rate has a negative and statistically
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significant impact on bank stock returns. Furthermore, interest rate volatility is found to be an
important determinant of bank stock return volatility and bank stock risk premium for the money
center and large bank portfolios. They find that the degree of persistence in shocks is substantial
(yet varies) for all three bank portfolios (strongest for large bank portfolio and weakest for the

7

money center banks), and sensitive to portfolio characteristics and the prevalent monetary
regime.
2.2. Impact of the yield curve on bank profitability
Theoretically, since bank’s earning assets (mainly loans and securities) usually tend to
exhibit longer maturities than their funding sources (i.e. liabilities), it is reasonable to anticipate a
positive relationship between an upward- sloping yield curve and profitability levels. To the

of

degree that banks experience a positive maturity gap between the average maturities of their

ro

assets and the average maturities of their liabilities, revenues from longer-term assets should

exceed expenses from shorter-term liabilities under an upward-sloping yield curve condition.
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Empirically, previous research has shed light on the impact of the yield curve on accounting-
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based measures of profitability. For example, Alessandri and Nelson (2015) compile a sample of
44 U.K. bank groups over the period 1992Q1 to 2009Q3 and find that the level and slope of the
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yield curve contribute positively to profitability (net interest margins) in the long run. However,
in the short run, they find that increases in market rates compress net interest margins. Further,
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they find that positive changes in the slope of the yield curve affect trading income in the
opposite direction, consistent with banks hedging interest rate risk through derivatives. Bolt et
al. (2012) report a positive net yield curve effect on net interest margins based on individual
bank yearly data for 19 countries from 1990-2007. Egly et al. (2018) find positive effects of the
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yield curve spreads on net interest margins that vary with bank size and change over time.
Specifically, for their full sample comprised of more than 5,500 U.S. commercial banks, the
change in net interest margins grows by 3.70%, given a 1% increase in the slope of the yield
curve. Additionally, they find that the impact of yield curve spreads on net interest margins is

8

greater for small, medium, and all banks combined in their recovery period (2009Q3 to 2016Q4)
estimations when compared to their initial period sample estimations (2001Q1 to 2009Q2).
3. Data and Methodology
3.1.Data
This research uses monthly equity return data for Canadian publicly-traded banks from
01/1997 to 08/2018 extracted from Datastream. Due to the concentrated nature of the Canadian
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banking system, the eleven banks included in our study consist of all publicly-traded Schedule 1
banks in Canada listed in the S&P/TSX composite index.6 Appendix A contains a list of the
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banks employed in the study. Using the complete set of publicly-traded banks also adds to the
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uniqueness and contribution of this paper, as most of the previous work on the Canadian banking
sector has focused on the ‘Big 6’ banks (e.g., Guidara et al., (2013); Calmes and Theoret (2014);

re

Mohsni and Otchere (2018)). The data for the Canadian yield curve (3-month Treasury Bill rate,
2-year, and 10-year Treasury Bond rate) was obtained via Statistics Canada:

lP

https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start (table 10-10-0122-01). Figure 1 provides a visual of the
interest rate environment in Canada over the sample period. Figure 2 indicates that Canada
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experienced an inverted yield curve during the year 2000, which was followed by sharp declines
in short-term interest rates. Canada, like other developed economies, experienced a second
prolong inverted yield curve that began in mid-year 2004 and ended in late 2006. Since then,
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long-term rates have been on the decline with gradual increases noted in recent times, while
short-term rates declined to historically low levels. Finally, Fama-French (1993, 2015) factors

6

Banks in Canada are distinguished with regard to whether they are domestic-owned (Schedule 1), foreign subsidiaries
operating in Canada (Schedule 2), or foreign bank branches operating in Canada (Schedule 3). For further information
please see http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/dti-id/bnk-bnq/Pages/default.aspx.

9

for North America are obtained via the Kenneth French’s website.7 Table 1 provides the
summary statistics for the variables included in this study.
The Fama-French variables used in our study do exhibit moderate correlation. As Fama
and French (2017) highlight, high book-to-market (B/M) value stocks tend to have low
profitability and investment levels, and low B/M growth stocks, especially large low B/M stocks,
tend to be profitable and invest aggressively. Specifically, the market (MRK) factor has

of

correlations that range from 0.2311 (with small minus big (SMB) to -0.3784 (with conservative

ro

minus aggressive CMA)). The highest degree of correlation amongst the Fama-French factors is
related to the high minus low (HML) factor. Its degree of correlation is highest with CMA

-p

(0.5978). The overall correlation results show that the market, size, value, profitability, and

re

investment factors (MRK, SMB, HML, robust minus weak (RMW), and CMA) have interesting
co-movement patterns which motivates us to examine equity returns. Finally, the yield curve

lP

exhibits fairly low correlations with the Fama-French factors. The highest degree of correlation
that the yield curve has is with the SMB factor (0.1931) and with the market factor (MRK) the
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correlation is only 0.0416.8

3.2.Methodology and the Models

Given the cross-section and time-series dimensions of the bank sample data set, panel
estimation techniques are employed to examine the impact of the yield curve on Canadian bank

Jo

stock returns over the period January 1997 through August 2018. Our asset pricing model is

7

This paper uses the North American Fama-French factors from Kenneth French website since specific factors for
Canada are not available through their website. See
https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. In the robustness section of this paper,
we replace the North American Fama- French factors with Canadian specific factors that were downloaded from the
Applied Quantitative Research (AQR) Capital Management LLC (https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Datasets/BettingAgainst-Beta-Equity-Factors-Monthly).
8
For brevity, in the narrative we highlight important correlation coefficients which are not presented in Table form.
Correlations tables are available from the authors upon request. As reported in the text, correlation coefficients are
low to moderate.

10

based on the Fama- French (2015) five-factor model and incorporates alternative measures of the
slope the yield curve (YC) under separate specifications. The use of the Fama-French factor
model is motivated by its underpinning to the dividend discount model and prior empirical
evidence that suggests that profitability and investment help capture additional variation in
average returns. Our sample of Canadian banks exhibit significant profitability and dividend
payment history during our sample period.

of

Our focus on the impact of the slope of the yield on bank equity returns allows us to

ro

validate the common belief that banks tend to fare better (i.e. improved cashflows due to higher
net margins and banks’ positive maturity gap) with an upward-sloping yield curve than under a
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horizontal or downward-sloping yield curve. Furthermore, since modern financial theory usually

re

associates upward-sloping yield curves with rising interest rates and economic expansion, we
anticipate a direct relationship between the slope of the yield curve and bank equity returns. To
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the extent that our bank sample consist of large and (valued-based) firms, we anticipate an
inverse (direct) relationship between the size and (value) risk factors per the Fama- French multi-

ur
na

factor model and bank equity returns. Value firms commonly exhibit high Book-to-Market (B/M)
levels. Drawing from Fama and French (2017) who find that high (B/M) value firms tend to
exhibit low profitability and investment levels, we anticipate an inverse relationship between the
profitability and investment risk factors per the Fama- French multi-factor model and bank

Jo

equity returns.

The model is estimated using fixed effects which assumes that differences across units

(banks in our case) are captured by the time- invariant (bank-specific) constant intercept terms.
This estimation is the preferred panel data technique assuming that 𝑧𝑖 (a vector of bank-specific

11

unobserved variables) is correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 (the regressors in our model)9. It is plausible that
bank-specific unobserved factors such as managerial ability, credit cultural, investment
strategies, market share objectives, etc., which arguably impact bank stock returns, may also be
correlated with the Fama-French model risk-factors. For example, 1) a conceivable relationship
between bank-specific market share objectives and the size risk factor (SMB), and 2) a likely
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connection between bank-specific investment strategies and the valuation risk factor (HML). To
validate this empirical approach, a series of diagnostic tests are applied. First, F test results from

ro

the fixed effects model determine whether there are differences across banks. Second, we
employ Hausman tests to determine whether fixed or random effects are the appropriate
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specification. The Hausman test statistic is Chi-square distributed; the null hypothesis is that

re

coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
fixed effects estimator. This panel estimation approach differentiates our research from the
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previous work by Barber and Lyon (1997), Viale et al. (2009), and Baek and Bilson (2015), who
apply a pooled approach or form bank portfolios on the basis of size and value risk factors. Our
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modeling approach allows us to capture bank-level heterogeneity and minimize any potential
bias that may result from the aggregation of banks into broader aggregates.10
To investigate the impact of shifts in the yield curve on bank equity returns, we expand
the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model to include alternative measures of the yield curve
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(YC) under separate specifications. Our benchmark model is expressed as follows:

If 𝑧𝑖 is unobserved yet correlated with 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 the least squares estimator of 𝛽 is biased and inconsistent due to an omitted
′
variable. However, in the instance where the model is 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖′ 𝛼 embodies all observable effects, an
estimable conditional mean equation can be specified. See Greene (2003).
9

10

Our estimation results and robust standard errors use the Huber-White sandwich estimator method. Such robust
standard errors can deal with concerns about the failure to meet ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions as to the
behavior of the error term. For example, problems about normality of the error-term distribution, heteroscedasticity
(non-constant variance of the error term conditioned on explanatory variable levels) ,or observations that exhibit large
residuals, high-leverage, or influence.
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + +𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑌𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)

where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the excess monthly return on bank stock i, (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ) is the excess monthly
return on the market portfolio, SMBt is the difference in monthly returns between a small-cap
portfolio and a large-cap portfolio, HMLt is the difference in monthly returns between a portfolio
of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, RMWt is the difference in

of

monthly returns between a portfolio of robust profitability stocks and one of weak profitability
stocks, and CMAt is the difference in monthly returns between a portfolio of conservative
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investment stocks and one of aggressive investment stocks. YC is one of the following measures:
1) The slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference between the 10-year Treasury Bond

re

between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury Bond rates.
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rate and 3-month Treasury Bill rate or 2) The slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference

Secondly, to test for the potential of significant asymmetric effects of the yield curve on

lP

bank equity returns, we expand our benchmark model to include (and adapt) the threshold model
specifications similar to Baur and Todorova (2018) as follows:
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑌𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑌𝐶𝑡 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

where the dummy variable Dt is equal to one if the yield curve is above a certain
threshold (mean of the YC series over the full sample period) and zero otherwise. Model (2)

Jo

statistically tests for asymmetry based on the coefficient 𝛽7.
To improve our understanding of asymmetric impacts of the yield curve on bank equity

returns, we separate the yield curve series into two parts, one which includes only yield curve
increases, 𝑌𝐶 + , and another including only yield curve decreases, 𝑌𝐶 − . This alternative model
is particularly interesting and important if positive yield curve betas and negative yield curve

13

betas have different signs which may lead to lower and insignificant average yield curve betas
and thus potentially misleading conclusions. The idea of this specification is to determine
whether investors (and or other relevant economic agents) respond differently to positive and
negative movements in the slope of the yield curve. This alternative model specification is
written as follows:
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
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𝛽6 𝑌𝐶 + 𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑌𝐶 − 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)
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Finally, we check for a possible lagged effect of changes in the slope of the yield curve
on bank stock returns. This lagged impact hypothesis is motivated by a number of empirical
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studies (e.g., Bolt et al., 2012) and supported by the under-reaction theory (Daniel et al. 1998),

re

and the gradual information diffusion hypothesis (Hong and Stein, 1999 and Hong et al., 2007).
To test for the lagged impact of changes in the slope of the yield curve on bank equity returns,

lP

we replace the contemporaneous yield curve term with its one-month lag in our model as
follows:

(4)
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑌𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

4. Results

4.1. Fama-French Five-Factor and Yield Curve Impact

Jo

Table 2 provides the results for our benchmark model (equation 1) under two
specifications over the full sample period (1/1997 to 08/2018). The first specification includes a
yield curve spread between the 10-year Canadian Treasury Bond rate and the 3-month Canadian
Treasury Bill (YC 10Y- 3M) while the second specification use the yield curve spread between
the 10-year and 2-year Canadian Treasury Bond rates (10Y- 2Y). Canadian banks reflect positive
and statistically significant market beta (MRK) coefficients of 0.6656 and 0.6679, respectively.
14

The relatively low market beta aligns with the common view from practitioners and academics
that Canadian banks are less risky and better capitalized compared to the U.S. and other foreign
banks. For example, Schuermann and Stiroh (2006) find that the market beta coefficients for
large banks in the U.S. market range from 1.0546 to 1.2520. It should be noted that the reported
market beta coefficients in Schuermann and Stiroh’s (2006) study are for the sample period from
1997 to 2005 and thus may not be directly comparable to our results. Nonetheless, we are able to
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gain some perspective of market betas for North American banks. Schuermann and Stiroh

ro

(2006) also show that the market risk factor is the dominant variable in explaining the variation
in bank stock returns followed by the Fama-French factors (SMB and HML).
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Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find the market beta increases monotonically with bank size

re

for their sample of U.S. banks over 1970 to 2013. Their portfolio of large banks has a market
beta of 1.22 compared to a market beta of 0.46 for a portfolio of the smallest banks; the results
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suggest that large banks were significantly more exposed to market risk as compared to small
banks. The authors attribute this large difference primarily to differences in leverage. Guidara et
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al. (2013) find that Canadian banks are well-capitalized based on their capital and leverage
capital buffers of 5.09% and 0.49% respectively, which exceed the minimum regulatory
requirements. These findings provide a possible explanation for Canadian banks’ lower market
beta risk and their ability to prevail during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.

Jo

A review of the (SMB and HML) factors suggests that only the value factor (HML) helps

to explain the variation in Canadian bank equity returns based on the positive and statistically
significant coefficients on the HML variable. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find that for their sample
of U.S. banks, SMB factor coefficients are close to 0.40 on the 1st 9 market-cap sized portfolios
with the SMB factor coefficient turning negative at -0.13 on the final (large market-cap) firm
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portfolio. The positive (and significant) coefficients on the HML variable in our estimations are
in line with those reported by Gandhi and Lustig (2015); in their study, loadings on HML
variable range from 0.50 for their smallest portfolio to 0.70 for their largest portfolio.
The profitability (robust vs. weak) and investment style (i.e., conservative vs. aggressive)
factors (RMW and CMA, respectively) have an unfavorable impact on bank equity returns given
the negative (and statically significant) coefficients reported on these two risk factors. The results
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related to investment style (our CMA variable) supports the findings of Titman, et al. (2013),

ro

who show that high investment is followed by low average returns in many equity markets.

Further, Fama and French (2017) also reported a negative coefficient for the investment factor.
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The negative coefficients related to profitability (our RMW variable) align with the results from
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Jareño et al. (2018) but are in contrast with the Fama and French (2017) results. The conflicting
results could be attributed to sample-specific characteristics and support the conjecture that
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Fama-French (2015) five-factor models most likely are sensitive to country-specific and industry
samples. The results of this study suggest that high levels of profitability generated by the
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Canadian banking sector lead to lower returns. While our results seem counterintuitive given that
higher expected earnings usually translated to higher expected returns, ceteris-paribus, Fama and
French (2015) report that holding operating profitably roughly constant, average equity returns
typically diminishes as firm size increases.

Jo

The key variable of interest in this study (the two yield curve measures) generates a

positive impact on bank equity returns as reflected in the statistically significant coefficients of
0.0028 and 0.0024 on the YC (10Y-3M) and the YC (10Y-2Y) yield curve variables,
respectively. This empirical evidence supports the notion that a steeper yield curve provides
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increased net interest income from the interest-rates carry trade11, which involves borrowing
shorter-term funds at lower interest rates and investing these funds in longer-term loans and
securities at higher interest rates. The positive yield curve spreads impact on bank performance
implies that investors expect improved earnings (and potentially a strengthened dividend stream)
that should translate to increased expected returns. Banks profitability should be positively
related to short-term interest rates as banks raise their loan rates and shrink their lending
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quantities in response to higher funding costs; however, the short-run and long-run effects can be

ro

different. If banks borrow short and lend long, and if their interest rates are not fully flexible in
the short run, banks will be exposed to repricing and yield curve risk. Our study shows that the

-p

yield curve is a factor in explaining bank equity returns, after controlling for market risk and

re

additional Fama-French risk factors.
4.2. Asymmetric Impacts
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Table 3 provides the results of Models 2 and 3, which test for asymmetric impacts of the
yield curve on bank equity returns. The Fama-French factors remain stable and consistent

ur
na

throughout these estimations based on the reported coefficients. In columns (1) and (2), the
coefficients on the dummy variables (YC(10Y-3M)*YC(D) and YC(10Y-2Y)*YC(D)) suggest
that there is an asymmetric impact of the yield curve spread on bank equity returns. Specifically,
during times when the yield curve spread is above its mean over the full sample period (steep

Jo

upward sloping yield curve), the influence it has on bank equity returns is positive with

Typical “interest rate carry trade” activities by commercial banks takes place when costs (tied to interest rates)
from funding sources (usually consisting of short-term claims: liabilities) are lower than revenues (linked to interest
rates) from longer-term earning assets (i.e. loans and securities). Banks earning assets usually tend to exhibit longer
maturities than their funding sources. This interest rate carry trade strategy should be profitable for banks with a
positive maturity GAP between their average maturity of assets and their average maturity of their liabilities and
under an upward sloping yield curve.
11
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statistically significant coefficients (albeit small in magnitude) of 0.0045 and 0.0060,
respectively.
Galbraith and Tkacz (2000) find evidence of an asymmetric impact of the yield spread on
output, particularly in Canada and the U.S. If we accept that the yield spread captures the
direction
of monetary policy to some degree, then YC spreads above the mean threshold could be
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associated with strong expansionary monetary episodes that may translate into positive sentiment

ro

and investor activity in financial equities. The coefficients for the yield curve factors (YC (10Y3M) & YC (10Y-2Y)) are both negative. The statistically significant coefficient on the YC (10Y-
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2Y) variable is almost three times greater than the coefficient on the YC (10Y-3M) variable

re

which was statistically insignificant. This may imply that banks (and their stock prices) are more
sensitive to the (10Y-2Y) yield curve spread as opposed to the (10Y-3M) spread. The negative
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impact of interest rate changes may suggest the presence of short-run repricing frictions, as
suggested by Alessandri and Nelson (2015). Unexpected increases in rates can initially compress
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banks' margins, and only in the long term does it become possible that higher interest rates
contribute to higher profitability, and thus equity prices.
The results of the alternative model (columns (3) and (4) of Table 3) also support an
asymmetric impact of the yield curve spread on bank equity returns. A negative yield curve
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spread series (i.e. negative YC movements measured by YC(10Y-3M)-) and YC(10Y-2Y)variables) elicit a negative response in bank equity returns. Consistent with our expectations,
positive changes in the yield curve spread measured through the YC(10Y-3M)+ and YC(10Y2Y)+ variables elicit a positive effect on bank equity returns. These results are an important
contribution to the current literature and suggest that banks’ reaction to interest rate movements

18

is influenced by the slope of the yield curve. One plausible explanation for the increased
response/reaction by banks and investors to yield curve shifts might relate to the increased
coverage given by the financial press on this economic indicator. Although the increase in the R2
is marginal, the asymmetric impacts reported in Table 3 highlight the importance of enhanced
bank-applied risk-control management particularly during periods of unconventional yield curve
environments.
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4.3. Pre- and Post-Crisis Results
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Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for Model 1, for the initial (pre-financial crisis) subsample period (1997M01 to 2007M12) and the final post-financial crisis sub-sample period
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(2009M1 to 2018M8), respectively. Following the global financial crisis, there has been an
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unconventional monetary policy that led short-term interest rates to approach the “zero-lowerbound”. This historical low-interest rate setting provides an opportunity to revisit bank behavior
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(and by extension bank equity returns) under this new economic environment. The Fama-French
factors (except for the RMW factor in the post-financial crisis period) remain relatively stable
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and robust across the estimations in both sub-sample periods. There is a modest decline in the
market risk (MRK) coefficients between the pre-and- post-crisis periods (i.e. pre-crisis
coefficients of 0.7526 and 0.7537 vs. post-crisis coefficients of 0.6212 and 0.6252). This finding
indicates that the sensitivity of banking stocks to market risk has diminished over time. This

Jo

decline in bank market betas is explained by the lower covariance of bank stock returns with
market returns for the period after the financial crisis and aligns with the findings of King (2009)
who document a decline in the market risk factor for a sample of banks from Canada, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
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The impact of the yield curve spreads on bank equity returns becomes relevant only in
the post-crisis period. The coefficients on the yield curve variables in the post-crisis period are
positive (yet small in magnitude reported at 0.0057 and 0.0068, respectively) and statistically
significant. The small magnitude of the yield curve coefficients aligns with previous literature
that suggests that the increased availability of advanced tools for measuring and managing
interest rate risk, reduces banks stock returns sensitivity to changes in interest rates (e.g., Ryan
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and Worthington, 2004; Joseph and Vezos, 2006). This empirical evidence is consistent with the

ro

hypothesis that interactions between financial institutions and monetary authorities tend to

increase in times of (and continues after) financial turbulence due to the existence of significant
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contagion effects. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the yield curve
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variables in the period after the global financial crisis suggests that changes in the yield curve
spread and equity price movements have strengthened over the past decade.
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At an initial glance, this stronger co-movement may be driven by economic prospects and
the flight-to-quality wave from high-risk stocks towards low-risk stocks and government bonds
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with more solid economic fundamentals. A closer look at our data shows that yield curve spreads
were indeed higher in the post-financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period
which helps to explain our findings; higher spreads potentially lead to higher net profit margins
(and improved cash flows), which would favorably impact bank-equity prices12. To untangle the
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potential effects of the slope of the yield curve on bank equity returns in the aftermath of the
GFC and a historically low-interest rate time period, we incorporate (under alternative
estimations) a crisis dummy variable in our full-sample regressions while controlling for the
slope of the yield curve. We find that the GFC dummy variable is statistically insignificant when

12

The mean yield curve spread (10Y-2Y) was (1.0893%) in the post-crisis period vs (0.8427%) in the pre-crisis
period.
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incorporated into model (1) using both the 10Y-3M and 10Y-2Y measures of the slope of the
yield curve. This is plausible since, as previously mentioned, the Canadian banking system
remained strong and stable during the GFC and did not require any form of a bailout.13 This
evidence provides academics and practitioners with updated information on how the impact of
the yield curve may change over time.
4.4. Gradual Information Diffusion (Lagged Impact)
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The regression results from Model 4 reported in Table 6, which tests the gradual

ro

information diffusion hypothesis, suggest that the impact of the slope of the yield curve on
banks’ equity returns in Canada diffuses over time based on the statistically significant
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coefficients on lagged yield curve spreads. If market participants react gradually to the arrival of
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new information, Siegel (1998) suggests that a reliable predictor of turning points in the business
cycle (e.g. the yield curve) would also serve as a useful tool for equity investors. The
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statistically significant coefficients for the lag of the (10Y-3M) and (10Y-2Y) variables are
0.0035 and 0.0026, respectively. Since the Bank of Canada (or other central banks) can exert
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considerable influence on the slope of the yield curve by setting short-term rates at levels that
encourage liquidity building by commercial banks, this finding has important monetary policy
implications. Monetary policy actions focused on keeping inflation within pre-defined target
thresholds may have the unintended consequence of influencing the likely direction of future
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bank equity returns. It is an open question whether such policy-induced trends (and their
eventual reversal due to exogenous economic shocks and/or changes in the course of monetary

13

Please note that we also included a dummy variable to capture the volatile nature of the financial markets during
the “dot.com bubble” correction in 2001. The coefficients for the “dot.com” dummy were also insignificant. In the
regression controlling for both the “dot.com” and the GFC periods, the coefficients for the 10Y-3M and 10Y-2Y
variables remain fairly stable (albeit small in magnitude) and statistically significant at 0.0027 and 0.0022,
respectively. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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policy) can have detrimental side effects on the stability of the financial sector or the economy as
a whole. Central bankers may find themselves facing a dilemma between the goals of
maintaining a stable price level, and avoiding any unfavorable interference with the price
formation processes on equity markets.
The Fama-French factors, along with the aforementioned yield curve factors, are
consistent with the specification identified as Model 1 that incorporates a contemporaneous yield

of

curve variable. This finding implies that momentum traders can benefit if they know where

ro

Canadian banks and investors are in their information diffusion cycle. Momentum traders can
enter into Canadian bank stocks approximately one month after a positive change in the yield

Further Analysis and Robustness

re

4.5.
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curve spread and potentially generate greater risk-adjusted returns.

We conducted several robustness tests. First, we ran our benchmark model, based on
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North-American Fama-French factors (aka “North American Factors”), using the more
parsimonious Fama-French three-factor model and including our yield curve spreads (i.e. YC
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(10Y-3M) and YC (10Y-2Y)) under separate specifications- (refer to Columns 1 and 2 of Table
7). The direction and statistical significance of regressor coefficients (inclusive of the yield
spread variables) align well with the results from our benchmark model. Second, to test the
robustness of the results, we rerun the specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 with the
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Canadian-specific factors aka “Canadian Factors” (MRK, SMB, and HML) downloaded from
AQR website. The MRK factor remains relatively consistent (coefficients 0.7532 and 0.7544)
based on North American Factors compared to coefficients of 0.5659 and 0.5686, respectively,
using the Canadian Factors. The HML factor remains positive and statistically significant when
using the Canadian Factors. The positive and statistically significant impact of the yield curve
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spreads on bank stock returns holds under both data sets (i.e. North American and Canadian
Factors). The only important difference in results surrounds the SMB risk factor when
employing these distinct data sets. The SMB factor has no impact on bank stock returns given
the statistically insignificant coefficients when using the North American Factors downloaded
from the Kenneth French website (see Columns 1 and 2). However, the SMB factor has a
negative impact on bank stock returns (statistically significant coefficients of -0.2717 and

of

0.2707, accordingly) based on the Canadian Factors.
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This difference in the findings with respect to the SMB factor impact on bank stock
returns is likely due to discernible difference in the composition of the data sets (i.e. North
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American Factors would seem to encompass a broader scope compared to the Canadian-specific

re

Factors available through the AQR website). As Griffin (2002) highlighted, no asset pricing
model can completely explain the variation in asset performance. The findings using the

lP

Canadian Factors lend some support to the findings of Griffin (2002) and Fama and French
(2012) that suggest country-specific versions of asset pricing models may yield more useful
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metrics when trying to explain the time-series variation in portfolio and individual stock returns.
Third, to capture lagged effects of positive and negative movements in the slope of the yield
curve on bank stock returns, we ran specifications based on Model 3, which is defined in our
“Data and Methodology” section, replacing concurrent yield curve spreads with their one-month

Jo

lags. With the exception of the lagged positive (L.YC (10Y-3M) + ) yield curve spread series,
lagged effects seem insignificant. Of note, concurrent positive and negative yield curve spread
series were statistically significant in the original specifications (refer to Table 3 Columns 3 and
4).
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Fourth, additional estimations were performed on our expanded benchmark model
(Model 2) that incorporates the asymmetric impact of yield curve slope effects on bank stock
returns employing alternative thresholds in place of the mean value of the yield curve series (e.g.,
median, moving averages, 75th percentile, etc.). The results were not significantly altered and the
alternative estimations are available from the authors upon request. Fifth, we explored two other
subsample periods (i.e. (1997-2006) and (2010-2018) to test the robustness of our results using

of

our benchmark Model 1. These sample-period time windows allow us to further insulate the pre

ro

and post 2007-2009 financial crisis periods. We chose to exclude the calendar year 2008 in our
sub-sample estimations to limit the largest noise component of the financial crisis that spawned

-p

major volatility swings in the equity markets. Our general conclusion remains unchanged in that

re

there is no impact of the yield curve spreads on stock returns in the pre-crisis period, and a
positive (and statistically significant) impact in the post-crisis period. These subsample

lP

estimations are available from the authors upon request.
5. Conclusion and Implications
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Given that the Canadian banking system has been one of the most stable and successful
in the world over the past several decades and was one of only a few that did not require a
‘bailout’ during the period of the 2007-2009 GFC, it is meaningful to explore how changes in
yield curve spreads affect Canadian banks’ equity returns. Examining how the Canadian banking
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system responds to macroeconomic shocks, particularly in the era of historically low interest
rates, is an important contribution to the academic literature on banks reaction to interest rates
movements since most of the published research focuses on the U.S and Europe banking
systems. We expand scant research that employs the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model
to bank-equity returns. Our specifications incorporate changes in the slope of the yield curve and
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test for asymmetric and lagged impacts of changes in yield curve spreads on Canadian bankequity returns. Furthermore, by applying a panel regression modeling approach, we depart from
the portfolio method commonly used in asset pricing modeling to explain equity return
variability. Our modeling approach allows us to account for the potential bank-level
heterogeneity that may exist within our bank sample.
Our results suggest that changes in the slope of the yield curve, together with the Fama-
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French factors, explain the variation in Canadian bank-equity returns. Equity returns of Canadian

ro

banks tend to react in an asymmetric manner to changes in the slope of the yield curve (i.e., yield
curve spreads above their mean values elicit a greater impact on bank equity returns than yield

-p

curve spreads that are below their mean values over our sample time horizon). Our findings

re

complement anecdotal evidence covered by the financial press that ordinarily reports a
connection between bank profitability (and by extension, bank stock performance) to yield curve

lP

conditions. Evaluating the yield curve spread regression coefficients at the mean yield curve
spread values during the recovery period for our sample of Canadian banks leads (on average) to
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a 3.9115% increase in the monthly excess bank equity returns. Canadian bank equity returns
have become more sensitive to changes in the yield curve spread in the post 2007-2009 Global
recession period. Lastly, the empirical evidence from this research suggests that the changes in
yield curve spreads may gradually diffuse into banks’ equity returns.
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Our findings suggest that portfolio managers need to be aware of the sensitivity of bank

equity returns to changes in the yield curve. Regulators must be cognizant of banks’ potential
shifts in profit-seeking behavior (e.g., increasing fee-based revenue sources) over a time that
could be tied to swings in the yield curve. Bank equity valuations may be negatively impacted in
response to reduced cash flows resulting from downward pressure on net interest margins during
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periods of unfavorable yield curve shifts. When this happens, banks are pressured to retain
profits and payout fewer dividends, especially when capital buffers fall below required levels.
Our findings have important implications for the estimation of banks' cost of capital and
implicitly suggest regulatory initiatives in favor of macro-prudential policy to evaluate bank risk.
Admittedly, there are many potential risk factors that might help to explain the behavior
of bank stocks (e.g. liquidity, foreign exchange, credit, market, etc.). An asset pricing model that

of

completely captures average returns does not, and most likely, will never exist. What this study

ro

highlights is that for bank stocks, country-specific versions of the traditional factor models using
country or regional factors can potentially yield marginal differences in the results. As Griffin

-p

(2002) suggested, cost-of capital, performance measurement, and risk analysis using Fama-

re

French-style models may be best done on a within-country basis. Further research may focus on
the following: 1) expanding the understanding of which global and regional factors are useful in

lP

obtaining factor-based asset model estimates (e.g. McCown, 2001) and Fama and French, 2012),
2) extending this study (that captures asymmetric, current, and lagged impacts of the slope of the
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yield curve on bank equity returns) by incorporating the level and curvature of the term structure
of interest rates, and 3) exploring and presenting up-to-date evidence on the evolution of market
risk factors that are used when evaluating bank stock returns.
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Figures

Figure 1: Canadian Interest Rates
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Note: Crisis periods represent the “Dot.com” bubble correction in 2001 and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis
(GFC)

Figure 2: Canadian Yield Curves Spreads
Note: Crisis periods represent the “Dot.com” bubble correction in 2001 and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis
(GFC)
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Max
0.1930
0.1156
0.1668
0.1728
0.1395
0.1458
3.7809
2.3010

re

-p

Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics Model Variables
Std.
Variable
Obs
Mean
Dev.
Min
RET
2,564
0.0025
0.0768
-0.3266
MRK
260
0.0065
0.0436
-0.1841
SMB
260
0.0015
0.0280
-0.1385
HML
260
0.0013
0.0341
-0.1401
RMW
260
0.0036
0.0258
-0.1536
CMA
260
0.0023
0.0275
-0.1071
YC (10Y-3M)
260
1.4121
0.9323
-0.2432
YC (10Y-2Y)
260
0.9650
0.6261
-0.1901
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Note: RET is the monthly equity returns of Canadian publicly traded banks excluding dividends. MRK, SMB,
HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. Where MRK is the excess
monthly return on TSX Composite index over the risk-free rate (3-month Canadian treasury bill), SMBt is the
difference in monthly returns between a small-cap portfolio and a large-cap portfolio, and HMLt is the difference in
monthly returns between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. The
original Fama and French (1997) 3-factor model (includes MRK, SMB, and HML) was extended by Fama and
French (2015) to include an additional two factors; one to account for profitability (RMW) and one to account for
aggressive investment stocks (CMA). YC (10Y-3M) is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury
yield. The sample covers from 1997M1 to 2018M8.
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-0.0032**
(0.0011)

Observations
R-squared
# of Banks

2,564
0.1955
11

2,564
0.1948
11

-p

-0.0047***
(0.0014)

re

Constant

ro

of

Table 2: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample
period 1997M1-2018M8
(1)
(2)
MRK
0.6656***
0.6679***
(0.0588)
(0.0588)
SMB
-0.0276
-0.0189
(0.0964)
(0.0949)
HML
0.5929***
0.5917***
(0.0354)
(0.0356)
RMW
-0.2782***
-0.2735***
(0.0666)
(0.0673)
CMA
-0.2756***
-0.2738***
(0.0631)
(0.0636)
YC (10Y-3M)
0.0028***
(0.0009)
YC (10Y - 2Y)
0.0024**
(0.0010)
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Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M)
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of the regression
coefficients
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Panel Models with asymmetric yield curve spread impacts. Dependent
Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample period 1997M1-2018M8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
MRK
0.6648***
0.6614*** 0.6689***
0.6769***
(0.0589)
(0.0586)
(0.0585)
(0.0543)
SMB
-0.0285
-0.0339
0.0008
-0.0170
(0.0964)
(0.0967)
(0.0914)
(0.0947)
HML
0.5883***
0.5935*** 0.5913***
0.5936***
(0.0344)
(0.0357)
(0.0384)
(0.0354)
RMW
-0.2885***
-0.2944*** -0.2826*** -0.2497***
(0.0652)
(0.0641)
(0.0592)
(0.0676)
CMA
-0.2790***
-0.2901*** -0.2663*** -0.2850***
(0.0628)
(0.0621)
(0.0617)
(0.0623)
YC (10Y-3M)
-0.0028
(0.0019)
YC (10Y-3M)*YC(D)
0.0045**
(0.0015)
YC (10Y-2Y)
-0.0076**
(0.0029)
YC (10Y-2Y)*YC(D)
0.0060***
(0.0017)
YC (10Y-3M) +
-0.0022
(0.0117)
YC (10Y-3M) -0.0224**
(0.0098)
YC (10Y-2Y) +
0.0273**
(0.0108)
YC (10Y-2Y) -0.0390***
(0.0116)
Constant
-0.0012
0.0010
-0.0028*
-0.0049***
(0.0016)
(0.0013)
(0.0014)
(0.0011)
Observations
R-squared
# of Banks

2,564
0.1962
11

2,564
0.1970
11

2,564
0.1961
11

2,564
0.1971
11

Jo

Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M)
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-monthTreasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. YC(D) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
level of the yield curve is above its mean and zero otherwise. + indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on
positive movements and – indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on negative movements. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively, of the regression coefficients
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Observations
R-squared
# of Banks

1,224
0.1586
10

1,224
0.1583
10
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, subsample period 1997M1-2007M12
(1)
(2)
MRK
0.7526*** 0.7537***
(0.0737)
(0.0735)
SMB
0.0693
0.0732
(0.1203)
(0.1205)
HML
0.5597*** 0.5584***
(0.0830)
(0.0827)
RMW
-0.2281** -0.2258**
(0.0967)
(0.0969)
CMA
-0.1679** -0.1668**
(0.0697)
(0.0707)
YC (10Y-3M)
0.0015
(0.0013)
YC (10Y-2Y)
0.0012
(0.0017)
Constant
-0.0047** -0.0038**
(0.0018)
(0.0016)
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Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M)
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of the regression
coefficients
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1,220
0.2290
11

1,220
0.2273
11
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Observations
R-squared
# of Banks
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Panel Models. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns, subsample period 2009M1- 2018M8.
(1)
(2)
MRK
0.6212***
0.6252***
(0.0677)
(0.0678)
SMB
-0.0992
-0.0752
(0.0712)
(0.0686)
HML
0.6469***
0.6483***
(0.1102)
(0.1111)
RMW
-0.2136
-0.1931
(0.1586)
(0.1631)
CMA
-0.5243**
-0.5314**
(0.1757)
(0.1798)
YC (10Y-3M)
0.0057***
(0.0013)
YC (10Y-2Y)
0.0068***
(0.0017)
Constant
-0.0072*** -0.0063***
(0.0019)
(0.0016)
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Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M)
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-monthTreasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year Treasury yield. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of the regression
coefficients
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Table 6: Fixed Effects Panel Models with lagged yield curve spread impacts. Dependent
Variable: excess bank-stock returns, full sample period 1997M1-2018M8

RMW
CMA
L.YC (10Y-3M)

Constant

-0.0057***
(0.0018)

0.0026**
(0.0011)
-0.0033**
(0.0012)

Observations
R-squared
# of Banks

2,564
0.1961
11

2,564
0.1948
11

re

L.YC (10Y-2Y)

of

HML

ro

SMB

(2)
0.6656***
(0.0588)
-0.0202
(0.0955)
0.5923***
(0.0355)
-0.2771***
(0.0669)
-0.2732***
(0.0637)

-p

MRK

(1)
0.6643***
(0.0587)
-0.0288
(0.0967)
0.5933***
(0.0352)
-0.2858***
(0.0652)
-0.2731***
(0.0634)
0.0035**
(0.0011)
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Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M)
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference
between the 10Y yield Treasury and the 2Y Treasury yield. The YC variables enter the models with a one-month
lag. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of statistical significance of
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of the regression coefficients
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Table 7: Fixed Effects Panel Models- robustness checks with Fama-French 3-factor model, AQR
data & lagged (+) and (-) changes of YC spreads. Dependent Variable: excess bank-stock returns,
full sample period 1997M1-2018M8
MRK
SMB
HML

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.7532***
(0.0565)
0.0589
(0.0956)
0.3500***
(0.0524)

0.7544***
(0.0564)
0.0650
(0.0941)
0.3510***
(0.0527)

0.5659***
(0.0345)
-0.2717***
(0.0798)
0.0976***
(0.0258)

(5)

0.5686***
(0.0343)
-0.2707***
(0.0793)
0.0976***
(0.0257)

RMW

0.0025**
(0.0009)

YC (10Y-2Y)

0.0034***
(0.0009)
0.0024**
(0.0010)

0.0047***
(0.0011)

-p

L.YC (10Y-3M) +

L.YC (10Y-2Y) -

Observations
R-squared
# of Banks

2,564
0.1876
11

-0.0052***
(0.0008)

-0.0064***
(0.0012)

lP

-0.0064***
(0.0011)

2,564
0.1871
11
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Constant
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L.YC (10Y-3M) L.YC (10Y-2Y) +

0.6685***
(0.0591)
0.0025
(0.0937)
0.5854***
(0.0351)
-0.2496***
(0.0684)
-0.2939***
(0.0630)

ro

YC (10Y-3M)

0.6684***
(0.0600)
-0.0084
(0.0958)
0.5884***
(0.0374)
-0.2508***
(0.0667)
-0.2911***
(0.0597)

of

CMA

(6)

2,564
0.1637
11

-0.0061***
(0.0010)

2,564
0.1634
11

0.0159*
(0.0079)
-0.0029
(0.0084)

-0.0027**
(0.0012)

-0.0039
(0.0071)
-0.0104
(0.0127)
-0.0016
(0.0013)

2,553
0.1952
11

2,553
0.1945
11

Jo

Note: MRK, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from the Fama-French (2015) model. YC (10Y-3M) is
the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and 3-month Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between
the 10Y Treasury yield and the 2Y Treasury yield. YC (10Y-2Y) is the difference between the 10-year yield and the 2year yield. + indicates a series of the yield curve based solely on positive movements and – indicates a series of the
yield curve based solely on negative movements.. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and ***
refer to levels of statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of the regression coefficients
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Net Income (MM)

781,126
938,580
622,746
28,107
21,944
46,854
266,879
1,335,242
8,897
1,325,821

2,218
4,386
2,635
129
77
118
1,049
6,051
13
5,233

of

Total Assets (MM)

ro

Appendix A: List of Canadian Publicly Traded Banks
Name
Ticker Symbol
Bank of Montreal *
BMO
Bank of Nova Scotia *
BNS
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce * CM
Canadian Western Bank
CWB
Equitable Group
EQB
LB
Laurentian Bank of Canada
National Bank of Canada *
NA
Royal Bank of Canada*
RY
State Street Capital Group
SCB
Toronto Dominion Bank *
TD
VersaBank
VB

1,765
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Note: There are 36 domestic (“Schedule I”) banks in Canada, but the 11 banks listed in this appendix are publicly
traded. The “Big Six” banks account for approximately 92.7% of the total assets and contribute almost 92% of the
credit to loan markets) according to the (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada). A
concentration ratio of 92.7% and a Herfindahl Index of 1679, suggests a moderately concentrated market structure.
Data on total assets and net income (dollar amounts expressed in millions-MM) are extracted from the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Intuitions website (https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/wt-ow/Pages/FINDAT.aspx) and
numbers reported are from June 2018. Our sample of publicly traded banks is comprised of dividend-paying equity
stocks * Denotes a “Big Six” bank.
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